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In response to Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009).
No aspect of civil law aggravates defendants more, it seems, than
punitive damages. Straddling the civil and criminal law, punitive
damages are awarded to a plaintiff in a private lawsuit, though they
are widely viewed as noncompensatory and in the nature of a penal
fine. Because such damages are assessed in civil lawsuits, the proce-
dural safeguards of the criminal law-such as the "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" burden of proof, the privilege against self-incrimination,
and the prohibitions against double jeopardy-generally do not apply.
This strange mixture of criminal and civil law objectives and effects has
always drawn controversy to this peculiar remedy, like a moth to flame.1
The clash of views is colorfully portrayed by early state supreme
court decisions. One court remarked, "The idea is wrong. It is a
monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence,
deforming the symmetry of the body of law."2 Yet, another court cha-
racterized punitive damages law as "an outgrowth of the English love
Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S.
(Wharton), J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to William Mills and Douglas
Rushton foi editorial assistance.
See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
("Punitive damages like class actions have been highly praised and roundly denounced
depending on who is paying the piper."), revd sub norm. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Plaintiffs in MDL 172 (In ie Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974), 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.
1980); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theoty uJPunitwe Damages, 84 TEX. L. RnV. 105, 107
(2005) ("Punitive damages are a tricky subject because they have this double aspect,
both civil and criminal.").
2 Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
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of liberty regulated by law" that "restrains the strong, influential, and
unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages re-
course to, and confidence in, the courts of law by those wronged or
oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not sufficiently
punished, by the criminal law.", Its grounding in essential justice, its
drawing from diverse ancient legal cultures,4 and its deep roots in ear-
ly English law all suggest that the punitive damages remedy is strong
enough to endure the onslaught of recurring challenges to this hybrid
creation of the law.
Yet, over the last two decades, the legitimacy, scope, and adminis-
tration of punitive damages have been rigorously tested under the
Constitution in a series of cases in the Supreme Court.5 These cases
have formed a growing body of jurisprudence that has spawned a
spate of scholarship on how punitive damages should be conceived
and administered. Into this maelstrom of clashing views has plunged
an important new commentator, Dan Markel, who offers novel in-
sights and proposals in a remarkable body of scholarship still in
progress: to date, this includes Retributive Damages: A Theoty of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction6 and How Should Punitive Damages Work?7
This Response focuses on the latter work and critiques its premise,
which was developed in the former, that public retribution should
play a major role in punitive damages. I offer an alternative view-
that private law should hold tight to the punitive damages remedy, a
device that, through the institution of private retribution, offers victims
of aggravated wrongdoing robust redress for the panoply of losses ag-
gravated by the flagrancy of a wrong. In addition, I briefly examine a
couple of Professor Markel's treatments of how punitive damages
should work, including the standard of proof and whether insurance
against punitive damages should be allowed. Though we differ migh-
tily on whether punitive damages should be directed principally to
achieve public retribution or private justice, I applaud his focus on
punitive damages' inherent pluralism and his close analysis of the ap-
propriate levels of procedural safeguards to keep this remedy from
3 Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis. 1914).
4 See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Proudicts Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REn. 1257, 1262 n.17 (1976) (examining this remedy's deep historical foundations).
) This line of cases essentially began with Browning-Ferris Industies qf Vnrmonl, Inc. v.
Keco Disposal, Inic., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
94 CORNELL L. REv. 239 (2009).
7 157 U. PA. L. REN. 1383 (2009). Professor Markel reports that he has a ftuther
piece in progress, Punitive Damages and Complex Liligation. Id. at 1390 n.9.
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bursting its proper bounds. Finally, I conclude that Professor Mar-
kel's extensive and creative scholarship on punitive damages helpfully
pushes observers of this strange remedy to reconsider their most fin-
damental thoughts about how it should ideally be configured.
I. RETRIBUTION AND RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE LAW
All agree that punitive damages serve a mixture of purposes.8
While courts typically refer only to "punishment" (meaning retribu-
tion) and "deterrence" as the purposes of such damages, ' Professor
Markel and others correctly point to a third important function-
added compensation, sometimes called "aggravated damages," for the
purpose of victim vindication and redress.'° Because courts almost un-
iversally proclaim that punitive damages are noncompensatory, in-
creasing scholarly recognition that flagrant wrongdoers should flly
restore the aggravated losses suffered by their victims is an important
rediscovery in the development of punitive damages theory.11
8 Indeed, the Supreme Court now evaluates the constitutionality of punitive dam-
ages in light of the damages' various functions. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991) (approving punitive damages ju y instructions that "reasona-
bly accommodated ... Alabama's interest in meaningful individualized assessment of
appropriate deterrence and retribution").
9 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432
(2001) (stating that punitive damages "operate as 'private fines' intended to punish
the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing"); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1998) ("[T]he purpose of punitive damages is to psi-
nish a party ... and to deter it and others from committing the same or similar acts in
the future."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive
damages are damages ... awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him f-rom similar conduct in the future.").
10 See Markel, supra note 7, at 1394-95, 1414. Other legal systems allow "aggra-
vated" or "moral" damages or some other form of relief to augment a victim's award in
cases of serious wrongdoing. See Owen, supra note 4, at 1264 n.23 (noting that Eng-
land's use of "aggravated damages" serves much the same function as punitive damages
and that Switzerland, Turkey, Norway, and Mexico provide for damages that are "puni-
tive" in nature). Thanks to Lotte Meurkens, a Ph.D. candidate at Maastricht University
who is preparing a dissertation on punitive damages law, for pointing out that punitive
damages have been subject to increasing debate in Germany, France, the Netherlands,
and various other European nations, despite traditional skepticism of such relief out-
side the United States. See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009) (collecting essays on the
role of punitive damages in various nations).
11 John Goldberg should be credited with revealing that punitive damages were
embedded in the veiy idea of legal injury in eighteenth-century English law, as chro-
nicled by Blackstone, and that the idea appears to have migrated to America. SeeJohn
C.P. Goldberg, Two Coceptions q'7Ton Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L.
RnV. 435, 455-62 (2006).
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While punitive damages undeniably are a hybrid remedy serving a
variety of functions, modern theorists often emphasize a single func-
tion, 2 and Professor Markel does the same. While lie charitably offers
refige to all three finctions-aptly labeled "retributive justice, cost
internalization, and victim vindication"'-he reenvisions the role of
punitive damages primarily through a public retributive-justice lens.
Thus, while his scheme is "pluralistic" in recognizing multiple purpos-
es of punitive damages, it structures punitive damages, first and fore-
most, to protect the perceived retributive needs of the public. In so
doing, it undermines the private justice demands of victims of aggra-
vated nisconduct.
In justifying punitive damages in terms of public retribution, Pro-
fessor Markel argues persuasively for minimizing both Type I (false-
positive) and Type II (false-negative) errors." Preliminarily, it seems
difficult to disagree with Professor Markel's premises that the law
should strive to minimize both types of error-first, that it should
avoid punishing persons who do not deserve punishment and avoid
punishing excessively those who do (hence avoiding false-positive er-
rors), and second, that it should capture as many flagrant offenders as
reasonably possible and punish them sufficiently (hence avoiding
false-negative errors). I agree that these abstract ideals are basically
sound, and I agree that due process properly requires the law to dili-
gently minimize false-positive errors. But Professor Markel and I di-
vide on the importance of avoiding false-negative errors and on the
costs we are willing to incur in that pursuit. In broadening the reach
of punitive damages-including placing in the hands of strangers as
well as victims the ability to enforce punitive damages against actors
guilty of flagrant misconduct that may (or may not) cause injury to
victims-Professor Markel expands this private law remedy into a pub-
12 See Markel, supra note 7, at 1387 n.5, 1393 & n.31, 1394 & n.32 (listing Guido
Calabresi, Bruce Chapman and Michael Trebilcock, Thomas Galligan, Keith Hylton
and Thomas Miceli, Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, and Catherine Sharkey as
examples of scholars in the "cost internalization" or "deterrence" school); id. at 1394 &
n.35 (listing Mark Geistfeld, Thomas Colby, Marc Galanter and David LUban, John
Goldberg, Anthony Sebock, and Benjamin Zipursky as examples of scholars in the "vic-
tim vindication" school).
11 ld. at 1403.
14 Markel, supra note 6, at 256-57, 265-66.
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lic penalty that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the public law
of crinmes, and then he hoists it up on stilts."
Professor Markel's special interest in reducing false-negative er-
rors-maximizing the number of flagrant offenders who are caught
and punished and assuring that they receive sufficient punishment-
may spring from his orientation as a professor of criminal law. Unlike
tort, restitution, and other branches of private law, which principally seek
justice between private parties in private disputes, criminal law instead fo-
cuses on the retributivejustice and deterrence needs of the public.
Private law is also interested in the public consequences of its
rules and adjudications, but its central concern is that victims are pro-
vided redress for the harmful effects of breaches of the civil law.'" In
cases of flagrant wrongdoing, retributive justice and deterrence are
important to private law, but what drives private law's engines are the
restitutionary and retributive needs of victims, not society. Thus, the
essential retributive goal of punitive damages, a remedy of the private
law, is to force wrongdoers to restore in fill the well-being of those
harmed by their aggravated misconduct. Call this "private revenge""
or call it "private retributive justice," but it is, at bottom, compensatory
in that it extracts money from a person guilty of flagrant wrongdoing
and uses it to repair resulting damage to the victim's basket of goods.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR "THEFT"
How private retributive justice accomplishes the restitutionary
needs of victims may be illustrated by a metaphor based on theft.18
The flagrant wrongdoer (the "thief") deserves, retributively, to pay the
1, While Professor Markel avoids enlisting the police and public prosecutors in his
effort to catch malefactors, his enlistment of every member of society is reminiscent of
the ruthless use of collaborators by police states in the past.
1 See, e.g.,John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status q/Tot Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law h[i the Redress f Wongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 530 (2005)
("[N]otwithstanding the dominant tendency among modern scholars to treat tort law
as an instrument for attaining public goals such as loss-spreading or efficient precau-
tion-taking, it is still best understood as a law of redress."); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699 (2003) (arguing that tort law is built
"on the principle that plaintiffs who have been wronged are entitled to some avenue of
civil recourse against the tortfeasor who wronged them").
17 See Thomas B. Colby, (leaig the Smoke/fom Philip Morris v. Williams: The Pasl,
Present, and Future PunitwieDamages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 433-34 (2008); see alsAnthony
J. Sebok, Punilive Damages: From M1yth to Themy, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1031 (2007)
("[A]n account of punitive damages as state-sanctioned revenge is the best interpreta-
tion of the practice.").
is This metaphor draws fiom David G. Owen, The Moial Foundations qfPunilive
Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 708-13 (1989).
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victim a punitive form of aggravated damages because the thief has
"stolen" goods from the victim that need to be returned in order to
prevent the unjust impoverishment of the victim as well as the unjust
enrichment of the thief. Once thrown out of balance by the offense,
the scales of justice can only be restored by corresponding restitution
for the theft.'
Initially, punitive damage awards serve to reimburse the plaintiff
for losses that the normal rules of damages do not compensate. While
providing plaintiffs a form of redress, modern rules of compensatory
damages fail to restore many of a plaintiff's actual losses, particularly
those involving intangible harm. For example, a severely injured per-
son who is rendered immobile for many months may lose a number of
important interpersonal relationships and will surely suffer a large va-
riety of missed (and often unknown) opportunities. There is no prac-
tical way for the law to ascertain such amorphous losses, as real as they
may be. Ordinarily, therefore, in fairness to injurers, such losses are
excluded from the compensation system and instead left on victims as
a risk of life. When actors inflict injury intentionally or pursue their
private interests in a manner that they know exposes others to substan-
tial undue risks, however, the equities of the situation change consider-
ably, and responsibility for ordinarily unrecoverable emotional and other
intangible losses properly may be placed upon the flagrant wrongdoer.]
Another, more esoteric loss suffered by theft victims, a form of loss
that nevertheless is very real, springs from the reprehensibility of theft
transactions. When an actor flagrantly violates the rights of another
person, the actor "steals" the victim's autonomy and thereby asserts
that the thief is of greater worth than the victim. If such autonomy
thefts are not subject to penalties in addition to requiring the thief to
restore the stolen goods (i.e., compensatory damages), the rectifica-
tion of the transaction is incomplete. This is because such theft trans-
19 See geneally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ I (Discussion Draft 2000) ("A person who is unjust]y enriched at the expense of
another is liable in restitution to the other.").
20 See, e.g., Stuart v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1886) (observing
that the punitive-damages doctrine probably "has its foundation in a failure to recog-
nize as elements upon which compensation may be given many things which ought to
be classed as injuries entitling the injured person to compensation"); see also Thomas
B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishmtnt Problerm: Punitive Damages as Punishmentfir I-
dividual, Private Wrangs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 615 (2003) (noting that early American
courts recognized that punitive damages serxed "not only as punishment, but also as
compensation for otherwise non-compensable harms"); Edw. C. Eliot, Exemplary Dar-
ages, 29 AM. L. REG. 570, 572 (1881) (asserting that punitive damages arose fiom "[t]he
difficulty of estimating compensation for intangible injuries").
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actions contain two distinct components: (1) the transfer of goods
from the victim to the thief, and (2) the deliberately wrongful nature
of the transfer in violation of the plaintiffs vested rights-the illicit
transfer of freedom from the victim to the thief.
While compensatory damages explicitly redress the first compo-
nent, at least to some extent, punitive ("extracompensatory" or "ag-
gravated") damages address both components. That is, in addition to
more robustly restoring the victim's stolen goods as conventionally
conceived, punitive damages serve also to restore the equality of the
victim in relation to the thief by diminishing the extra worth and
freedom held illicitly by the thief who stole these fundamental goods
of personhood from the victim.2' By vindicating a person's right to re-
main free from flagrantly inflicted harm through compensation for the
aggravated nature of the person's damages attributable to the aggra-
vated nature of the wrong, the law restores and reaffirms the equal
worth and freedom of the person victimized by the flagrant wrong. 
99
Finally, although the payment of attorneys' fees and other costs of
litigation ordinarily is not articulated as an explicit purpose of puni-
tive damages, it sometimes is, and requiring a plaintiff to incur these
substantial costs to rectify a theft or other aggravated wrong appears
fundamentally unfair. Because at least one-third of a plaintiff s recov-
ery is ordinarily expended on legal fees, a verdict that does not in-
21 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 3 (Discussion Draft 2000) ("A person who interferes with the legally protected rights
of another, acting withoutjustification and in conscious disregard of the other's rights,
is liable to the other for any profit realized by such interference.").
22 See, e.g., Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 533 (S.C. 2000) ("[P]unitive damages
[provide] vindication ... and ... compensate or satisfy for the willfulness with which
the private right was invaded ...." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goldberg, su-
pro note 11, at 442 (explaining Blackstone's conception that "money awarded should
suffice to provide satisfaction for the vicmizaion, including not only the harm caused
to the victim, but also the objective fact of having been mistreated by another" and not-
ing "Blackstone's observation that claims for particularly heinous or willful wrongs may
subject the tortteasor to a statutory multiplier Or 'very large and exemplary damag-
es' .. . [as] part of the redress to which the victim is entitled because of the nature of
the tortfeasor's mistreatment of the victim"); Sebok, supra note 17, at 1020-22 (arguing
that punitive damages provide redress by allowing private revenge for abusive, harmful
behavior).
2, See, e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn.
1966) (noting that the lower court had awarded punitive damages in the form of at-
torneys' fees but holding that punitive damages were inappropriate); St. Luke Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 36 (Md. 1990) (holding that "when-
ever punitive damages are appropriate, the amount of reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in the pending litigation may be considered by thejury"); see alo Markel, su-
pra note 7, at 1401-02 ("The defendant should also pay plaintiffs lawyers' fees (for the
marginal labor necessary to prove the defendant's reprehensibility) .. ").
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clude a sum for these and other litigation expenses almost always
leaves the plaintiff substantially worse off than before the injury. Re-
gardless of whether requiring an injured plaintiff to suffer this signifi-
cant detriment makes sense in an ordinary case, it is plainly an illogi-
cal and unjust result when victims must use the law to obtain redress
from thieves. In such cases, it is surely thieves-not victims-who
should pay the costs of activating and driving the legal system to re-
store stolen goods to their rightful owners.
The theft metaphor reveals the elementally restorative purpose
served by punitive damages. As a matter of desert, it seems self-
evident that a defendant who has intentionally or wantonly injured
another should fairly be required, as much as a money judgment is
capable of doing, to remove from the plaintiff s life all traces of the
aggravated wrong. While the public and private hats of retributive
justice overlap, Professor Markel's proposal to remove the private hat
of retributive justice altogether and to scoop up all retributive damag-
es as public fines solely for the state subverts the critical retributive,
restitutionary interests protected by the private law. For aggravated
wrongdoing like theft, the private law should jealously guard its puni-
tive damages remedy to assure that victims are fully compensated for
their various losses.
III. MAKING PUNITIVE DAMAGES W RK
After explaining why and how punitive damages should be frag-
mented pluralistically into their functional components, Professor
Markel adroitly examines a variety of secondary issues, such as settle-
ment, insurance, procedural, and constitutional matters to determine
how they fit together under his disaggregated scheme.]C Apart from
difficulties raised by the dominance of public retribution in his
scheme, he masterfully explains why a large number of procedural sa-
feguards should or should not be applied to the separate components
of punitive damages-retributive, deterrence, and aggravated damag-
es-in his reconstructed scheme. Explaining that compensation-
grounded forms of punitive damages (including both aggravated
damages and deterrence damages available after Philip Morris USA v.
24 See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Jetibution, and Due Process, 81 S.
CAL. L. REN. 263, 284 (2008) ([T]he inadequacy of compensatory damages continues
to supply a defensible rationale for punitive damages-the type of explanation re-
quired by any retributive rationale for these awards.").
2) Markel, sulva note 6, at 302-04.
26 Markel, supra note 7, at 1422-78.
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Williams2 ) might well escape constitutional limitation altogether,
2 8
Professor Markel argues that safeguards for defendants confronted
with retributive damages (of the public kind) should trod a middle
path between the basic safeguards normally applied in private litiga-
tion and the significantly heightened protections afforded by the Con-
stitution to those accused of criminal misdeeds.
A good example of Professor Markel's intermediate position on
many procedural-safeguard issues concerns the standard of proof.
Professor Markel agrees with the popular reform, adopted by niostju-
risdictions in recent decades, of raising the standard of proof from a
"preponderance of the evidence" (the standard used in ordinary pri-
vate law litigation) to one of "clear and convincing" evidence. 30 This
salutary adjustment of the standard of proof for punitive damages fo-
cuses decisionmakers on the evidentiary merits of each case and pro-
vides courts with both authority and the obligation to closely monitor
the sufficiency of the evidence for such awards.31
Whether insurance contracts for punitive damages should be al-
lowable as a matter of public policy is a complex matter on which
courts are Split.12 In view of the starkly punitive purpose of his retribu-
tive damages scheme, one might expect that Professor Markel would
agree with courts that prohibit insurance against liability for punitive
damages on the ground that the retributive effects of such liability are
aimed solely at aggravated wrongdoers who deserve the punishment
and who thus should not be allowed to shift it to innocent third par-
ties. Moreover, because he argues that an important purpose of retri-
butive damages is to remove the wrongdoer's ill-gotten gains,' one
would assume that Professor Markel would oppose insurance that
would restore such gains. Instead, based on reasoning that is not al-
together clear, 4 he argues that such insurance contracts should be al-
27 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
28 Markel, sulna note 7, at 1425-27.
29 Ld. at 1427, 1432.
?10 Id. at 1436-37. Roughly half the states have legislation to this effect, and many
more have adopted this reform by judicial decision. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILiTYLAw § 18.6, at 1257 & nn.22-23 (2d ed. 2008).
M I disagree, however, with Professor Markel's view that a preponderance of the
evidence standard is preferable for aggravated and deterrence damages, see Markel,
sutla note 7, at 1437, because I believe that these, too, are property grounded in retri-
butivejustice, albeit retribntivejustice of the private kind.
See OWEN, supra note 30, § 18.5, at 1236-37 & nn.40-42.
33 Markel, supra note 7, at 1401.
34 Indeed, his arguments with respect to judgment-proof defendants and loss
spreading, id. at 1465, as well as his arguments regarding how prohibiting insurance
might increase risks to workers and customers, id. at 1469, are quite elusive.
2010]
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lowed. He explains that intentional wrongdoing is not insurable in
any event, thus reducing the question to whether courts should allow
insurance against reckless misconduct, a context where competing,
complex considerations are difficult to resolve.' Although lie does
not voice this view, insurance might well be justifiable for recklessly
inflicted harm if courts administer punitive damages poorly and allow
substantial false-positive errors-i.e., if courts frequently hold inno-
cents liable for such damages. Furthermore, to the extent that puni-
tive damages truly are compensatory (aggravated and limited deter-
rence damages under his scheme), allowing insurance when a
defendant is facing insolvency may possibly be sound. But, if the law
were to adopt Professor Markel's public retribution scheme, then it
seems quite clear that insurance contracts against such assessments
should be disallowed. While Professor Markel's views on these matters
may be preliminary, " the remarkable thing about his expanding puni-
tive damage model is how elaborately fine-tuned most aspects of it tru-
ly are. In time, one may hope that he will have an opportunity to cla-
rify why and how these important insurance issues should be resolved.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES PURPOSES REDUX
Much of what Professor Markel suggests in explaining how proce-
dural safeguards should be applied to punitive damages makes good
sense. Yet, the radical way in which he would restructure punitive
damages leads one ineluctably to reconsider how the various purposes
of punitive damages properly should be configured under the devel-
oped constitutional jurisprudence that increasingly has cabined such
awards over the past two decades. Perhaps because of our separate
orientations-his from the public law of crimes, mine from the private
law of torts-I think his restructuring is exactly backwards. While it
seems quite normal to a person who studies the law of torts to assume
that the retributive-justice and deterrence goals of punitive damages
spring primarily from the private law's efforts to redress victim inter-
ests, I admit to having blithely accepted public retribution and public
deterrence as beneficial side effects of this hybrid remedy, even as ju-
ries, in certain high-profile cases, sometimes bloat this public side of
Id. at 1463-64.
3 See OWEN, sufpa note 30, § 18.5, at 1237 ("When the law is poorly defined and
poorly administered ... I the risk of undeserved punitive damage awards is substantial,
making insurance contracts for such events more reasonable.").
,7 See Markel, supra note 7, at 1422-23.
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the remedy. As the Supreme Court has marched ever deeper into the
briar patch of punitive damages, I have viewed its foray largely as an
untoward intrusion on the private law, almost as a trespass. Professor
Markel's probing scholarship, in provoking a renewed focus on the
separate functions of punitive damages, has provided me with new in-
sights into what may be the essence of the Supreme Court's objections
to how this remedy has developed and been applied in recent decades.
Surely, the Court has long been concerned about the growing size
of such awards (albeit in a very small number of cases) and worried
that the absolute magnitude of some punitive assessments is somehow
outside the bounds of fairness.38 But the sheer size of these awards in
some prominent cases-for example, the Exxon Valdez oil-spill case,39
the McDonald's hot-coffee-spill case,' any number of recent tobaccoI I 12
cases, and, long ago, the Ford Pinto fuel-system-fire case -may
simply be a symptom of the problem. Plaintiffs' counsel and juries in
these cases have used punitive damages for purposes the law has long
stated to be appropriate: punishment and deterrence. And, in these
cases, the punishment and deterrence assessed by the juries have been
largely of the public form. Yet, what juries and courts normally do with
punitive damages-directly contrary to the usual interpretation of
their express goals-is provide additional compensation to theft victims
(to return to this metaphor), awarding them the "aggravated" damag-
es that naturally flow from aggravated wrongs. This truly reparative
use of punitive damages is revealed empirically by how modest most
318 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of puni-
tive damages are skyrocketing.... The threat of such enormous awards has a detri-
mental effect on the research and development of new products.").
?1 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614, 2634 (2008) (reducing
the $5 billion jmy verdict, aheady remitted by the Court of Appeals to $2.5 billion, to
$507.5 million).
40 See Liebeck v. McDondald's [sic] Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. 93-02419, 1994 WL
16777706 (D.N.M. Sept. 16, 1994) (proposing a remittitur from the $2.7 million ver-
dict to $480,000), vacated, 1994 W"L 16777704 (Nov. 28, 1994); see also OWEN, sulnfa
note 30, § 18.1, at 1180 (discussing Liebeck).
41 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 350-52 (2007) (vacating a
$79.5 million verdict); see also OWEN, supra note 30, § 18.7, at 1280 (discussing Philip
Morris USA).
42 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 358, 391 (Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding remittitur of a $125 million award to $3.5 million); see also David G. Owen,
Problemrs in Assessing Iunitive Damages Against Manu/wcturers f Defective Proiucts, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1982) (discussing Grimshaw); Gary T. Schwartz, The Myh (/ lhe
FordPinlo Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REX. 1013 (1991).
20101
192 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158:181
PENNumbra
punitive damage awards truly are-on average, less than their compa-
triot compensatory awards.3
Hence, I believe that the law deludes itself and is wrongheaded
when it says categorically that a plaintiff is not "entitled" to punitive
damages and that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and
deter, not to compensate the plaintiff.44 By such assertions, I think
what the law has actually meant is that punitive damages are distinct
from the developed law of limited "compensatory" relief ordinarily
available and that such damages are assessed in addition thereto both
to fully restore victims of aggravated wrongdoing with monetary relief
for their stolen goods, equality of worth, and other freedoms and to
discourage malefactors from similarly harming such victims in the fu-
ture. This is what I think the law principally, properly means by the
punitive damages goals of punishment and deterrence-private retri-
bution and private deterrence. For these thefts, private law principles
of retributive, restitutionary justice in fact demand that thieves "re-
turn" full payments, in money damages, for their victims' stolen free-
doms as well as for their stolen goods.
CONCLUSION
Private law has long embraced the twin purposes of punishment-
retribution and deterrence-as supportive features of its central pillar
of restitution. 46 While it usually resides quietly out of sight, retributive
43, See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH &
JURYTRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 7 tbl.8 (2008); Sebok, supra note 17, at 971-73.
44 While most states hold that punitive damages are awardable only at ajmy's dis-
cretion, I am attracted to the sentiment that "[a] plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive
damages if the act complained of is determined to be willful, wanton or reckless."
Camp v. Components, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis add-
ed). A legislature thus might beneficially provide plaintiffs with a right to punitive
damages, in cases of flagrantly harmful misconduct, to advance this remedy's restitu-
tionary goal.
, This locates me squarely in the "victin vindication" school, as Markel dubs it, see
swfra note 12, though "private law redress" might be a better description. Students in
this school sit at the feet of Ernest Weiniib, whose pioneering work on the correlativity
of wrong and harim in private law provides the modern bedrock for tort theory, includ-
ing punitive damages. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRITATE LAW
(1995).
46 See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (5th ed. 1984) ("[P]reventing
future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned
not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer."); id.
at 26 ("This idea of prevention shades into that of punishment of the offender for what
the offender has already done, since one admitted purpose of punishment is to pre-
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justice in particular lies naturally beside restitutionary justice in the
private law regime. Wlat has troubled the Supreme Court, as it has
reviewed multimillion dollar punitive damage judgments in recent
decades, is how inflated the public-retribution side of this remedy has
become in relation to private law's principal enterprise-returning
wrongfully taken goods to the victim. When the balance of the mixed
functions in punitive damages tips too heavily toward the public's in-
terest in retribution and deterrence and away from compensation, the
Court understandably becomes uncomfortable with results that look
suspiciously like they spring from a public law scheme for inflicting
punishment that has masked itself in a regime marked "private."
Long characterized as "quasi-criminal," punitive damages have al-
ways appeared to occupy a middle ground between the civil and crim-
inal law. Nonetheless, this hybrid remedy has been firmly grounded
in private law's task of restorative redress for victims of aggravated
wrongs. Drawing from his study of the criminal law, Professor Markel
lends a variety of public law perspectives to the dual problems of
properly conceiving the mixed goals of punitive damages and making
them work under the constitutional umbrella recently erected by the
Court. In this pursuit, he lops off the public-retribution function of
punitive damages and elevates it to a new nether region of "interme-
diate sanction" that lies closer to the criminal law and farther from its
home in the private law of restitution.
Professor Markel and I agree that many aspects of punitive dan-
ages need adjusting and that, more generally, its functions need care-
ful reconsideration. Indeed, his intense analysis of retributive justice
is a singularly important study of this essential topic. Yet, by redirect-
ing retribution's focus in punitive damages law away from victims of
aggravated wrongdoing to the public at large; by expanding the realm
of enforcement with a kind of "reprehensibility in the air," without
need of harm or victim and enforceable by the world at large; and by
minimizing victim rights to restitutionaryjustice and relegating them
to an afterthought, the Markelian scheme aggravates punitive damag-
es in any number of untoward ways.
One has to wonder about the Kafkaesque world constructed by
Professor Markel, where free-floating reprehensibility is enforceable at
will by any disgruntled law student who may lie in wait outside the of-
fice or home of a law professor who-after a long and dreary day of
vent repetition of the offense."); Clarence Morris, Rough f.stice ard Some Utopiari Ideas,
24 ILL. L. REV. 730, 733 (1930) (explaining that the two different functions of tort law,
compensation and punishment, provide "a rough and ready sort of justice").
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trying mightily to enlighten students in the classroom, colleagues in
committees, and others through rigorous scholarship-enjoys a favo-
rite wine and then operates a car harmlessly (if erratically) only to be
apprehended by the student for this misbehavior." I prefer the world
we now inhabit-a world that answers to the clarion call of "no harm,
no foul," a world where enforcers wear metal badges or have been
personally harmed by flagrant wrongs, and a world where punitive
damages are restitutionary in nature.
Nevertheless, by aggravating punitive damages with such skill and
vigor, Professor Markel forces us to ponder anew how this hybrid re-
medy should be conceived, how it should be defined and limited, how
it should be enforced, and, broadly, what kind of role punitive dam-
ages should play in addressing aggravated wrongdoing.
Preferred Citation: David G. Owen, Response, Aggravating Punitive
Damages, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 181 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/2-2010/Owen.pdf.
47 Slightly altered, this is Professor Markel's own example. See Markel, supra note
7, at 1467 11.271.
